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1 Introduction
Most of the voting literature is set in the Arrovian framework, where voters rank the available
candidates and Arrow’s impossibility theorem prevails. I consider a different informational
basis for social decisions, by allowing voters to evaluate candidates rather than to rank them.
A celebrated example is the system of Approval Voting (Brams and Fishburn, 1978), in which
two evaluations are available, “approve” and “disapprove”, and the candidate with the most
approvals wins the election. Extensions of this voting system with more than two evaluations
have burgeoned recently in the literature and have even been experimented in the lab and in
the field (Balinski and Laraki, 2011; Baujard et al., 2016). These extensions are appealing, as
they offer a lot of freedom to voters, who can - to some extent - express the intensity of their
preferences.
In a situation where voters evaluate candidates, the question arises of how best to aggregate
evaluations so as to compare the candidates. Additive rules interpret the evaluations as grades,
selecting as winner the candidate with the highest total grade. They are sometimes referred
to as “utilitarian” voting rules (Hillinger, 2005). Other rules are conceivable as well, such
as comparing candidates according to their median evaluation (Balinski and Laraki, 2011) or
to their minimum evaluation (Aleskerov et al., 2010). To distinguish among existing rules, I
provide an axiomatic analysis, with a focus on additive rules.
The first part of the analysis is set in a simple setting, where a rule is conceived as a
ranking of evaluation vectors, that candidates may receive. Besides its application to voting
procedures, the formal analysis is thus also relevant to ranking systems with evaluations. Such
procedures are widely used in various settings, from the ranking of research projects by scientific
committees to the ranking of restaurants or movies on designated websites.
Section 3 considers a discrete case where the number of available evaluations γ is finite
(Section 3). The Evaluative Voting rule assigns equally spaced values to the evaluations (from
1 to γ) and compares candidates according to their total value. I show that it is characterized
by the axioms of Strong Pareto and Compensation - an increase in the evaluation of a voter can
be compensated for by a decrease in the evaluation of another voter. I then provide a second
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and finer axiomatization of the rule, with a property of measurability of evaluation increments,
which stresses the transparency of the rule.
Section 4 moves to the finer evaluation set [0, 1] (Section 4). The counterpart of Evaluative
Voting is then called Range Voting. In that case, imposing a measurability assumption is no
longer necessary to obtain additive separability. First, applying Debreu’s theorem, the class
of additively separable rules is characterized with the help of an axiom of Separability - the
evaluations of indifferent voters should not matter for social decisions. Second, I show that
Range Voting is the only rule among this class that satisfies two natural invariance properties.
The aforementioned characterizations of Evaluative Voting and Range Voting are obtained in
a simple setting of ranking rules. However, a voting rule can be best described, more generally,
as a mapping from the profile of evaluation ballots to the winning candidate. To justify the use
of the simple setting, Section 5 provides a structural result, describing conditions under which
a voting rule is induced by a ranking rule. I conclude with the axiomatizations of Evaluative
Voting and Range Voting in the general setting of voting rules.
The article contributes to the recent literature on “voting with evaluations” by providing
a unified treatment of additive rules in that context. I show that Evaluative Voting can be
characterized by a simple measurability assumption for arbitrary finite evaluation sets. This
result is thus broader than the characterizations of Evaluative Voting obtained for three eval-
uations (Alcantud and Laruelle, 2013) and for numerical evaluations (Gaertner and Xu, 2012).
In the continuous case, the axiomatization of Range Voting is more precise than that of Pivato
(2013a), as it characterizes the rule within the class of additively separable rules, whereas Pivato
(2013a) treats all rules of this class as equivalent to Range Voting. Furthermore, Section 6.1
uses the results of the discrete and continuous cases to compare the two related notions of
Separability (for a fixed electorate) and Reinforcement (for a variable electorate), which have
been shown to be central to the characterization of additively separable (resp. scoring) rules
in the literature (Krantz et al., 1971; Pivato, 2013b). Finally, the structural result provided in
Section 5, relating voting rules to ranking rules, is general and could be used to study other
voting rules.
3
2 A simple framework : ranking rules
The electorate is composed of a finite set of voters I. Voters vote by evaluating a finite set of
candidates X. The evaluation set Γ is a language through which voters express their opinion:
they assign an evaluation in Γ to each candidate. The set Γ is endowed with a linear order ≥Γ
(asymmetric part: >Γ), where a >Γ b means that a is a better evaluation than b. There is no
restriction on the ballots - the set of ballots is ΓX - for instance, a voter can assign the same
evaluation to several candidates.
I consider two types of evaluation sets in this article. The first case deals with a finite
evaluation set Γ. This case is general, the evaluations can be numerical (e.g. Γ = {1, 2, 3})
or qualitative (e.g. Γ = {A,B,C}). In the second case, I take Γ = [0, 1], so that voters can
express their opinion from a finer grid.
As each candidate receives an evaluation vector u = (ui)i∈I ∈ ΓI in this election, I define an
aggregation rule as a ranking on evaluation vectors.1 The implicit assumption here is that the
candidate whose evaluation vector is ranked the highest will be elected, this assumption will
be later justified in Section 5. Formally, a ranking rule is a complete and transitive binary
relation  on the set of evaluation vectors ΓI . I denote by ∼ its symmetric part and by  its
asymmetric part.
Range Voting (RV). This rule was proposed by Smith (2000) for the evaluation set Γ =
[0, 1]. The rule is additive: u RV v ⇔
∑
i∈I ui ≥
∑
i∈I vi. It is formally equivalent to the
utilitarian social welfare ordering, but the evaluations are restricted to fall between 0 and 1.
Evaluative Voting (EV). This rule, proposed by Hillinger (2005), is a discrete analog of
Range Voting. I define it for any finite evaluation set Γ. Let γ be the number of evaluations in
Γ: γ = #Γ. First, define the EV-value fEV : Γ → {1, . . . , γ} by fEV (a) = #{b ∈ Γ|a ≥Γ b}.
The EV-value of an evaluation a ∈ Γ is the number of evaluations that are not better than a.2
1This notion corresponds to the concept of social welfare ordering in the economic theories of justice
(d’Aspremont and Gevers, 2002), the difference here being that Γ 6= R.
2There is an immediate parallel with the Borda score for ordinal rankings: in that case, the score for being
ranked at the j-th position is the number of positions not higher than j.
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Second, the Evaluative Voting rule is defined by u EV v ⇔
∑
i∈I f
EV (ui) ≥
∑
i∈I f
EV (vi).
Two particular cases of EV are worth mentioning. When Γ = {“approve”, “disapprove”},
with the order “approve” >Γ “disapprove”, EV is exactly the Approval Voting rule. Another
noteworthy benchmark is when the number of evaluations equals the number of candidates:
γ = #X. There are two types of ballots in that case: those which assign each evaluation to
exactly one candidate and those which do not. Each ballot of the former type is uniquely linked
to an ordinal ranking on the set of candidates. If all ballots are of this type, it is easy to see
that the candidate elected under EV is the Borda winner of the associated profile of rankings.
Thus, when γ = #X, EV can be seen as an extension of the Borda voting system, because
voters are in no way restricted when assigning evaluations to candidates.
3 Discrete scale: Evaluative Voting
In this section, the evaluation set Γ is finite, and I sometimes refer to the example where
Γ = {A,B,C,D} with A >Γ B >Γ C >Γ D. For a given evaluation set Γ, what properties are
characteristic of the EV rule?
The first remark is that the EV rule is efficient with respect to the order ≥Γ on the evalu-
ations, as captured by the following property. A rule satisfies Strong Pareto (SP) if for any
u, v ∈ ΓI such that ∃i ∈ I, (ui >Γ vi) and (∀j 6= i, uj ≥Γ vj), we have u  v. Note that this
axiom also conveys a notion of positive responsiveness (May, 1952) of the rule: when any of
her evaluations is raised, a candidate must benefit.
Another distinctive feature of the EV rule is that it involves interpersonal measurability
of evaluation increments. If a ∈ Γ is not the highest evaluation in Γ, we denote by S(a) the
successor of a, formally: S(a) = min{b ∈ Γ|b Γ a}. A rule  respects Compensation
(Comp) if for any u, v ∈ ΓI such that ∃i, j ∈ I, (vi = S(ui), uj = S(vj)) and (∀k 6= i, j, uk =
vk), we have u ∼ v. This axiom states that, starting from any evaluation vector u, a single-
increment rise in the evaluation of a voter i (e.g. from C to B) can be compensated for by a
single-increment fall in the evaluation of another voter j (e.g. from A to B).
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The axiom (Comp) follows the tradition of cancellation axioms, stating that a tie between
the candidates should be declared for some “balanced” profiles of ballots. These axioms have
been used to characterize the Borda rule (Young, 1974), the Approval Voting rule (Alós-Ferrer,
2006) and the EV rule in a specific case with three evaluations, when Γ = {“in favor”, “indif-
ferent”, “against”} (Alcantud and Laruelle, 2013).3 The two former properties are sufficient to
characterize the EV rule.
Theorem 1. Let Γ be a finite set. A rule  satisfies (SP) and (Comp) if and only if it is
the Evaluative Voting rule EV .
This axiomatization of the EV rule holds for any finite evaluation set Γ: no assumption is
made on the number of evaluations, and the evaluations are only assumed to be linearly ordered.
The result is in this sense more general than the characterizations of the EV rule provided
in Alcantud and Laruelle (2013) for γ = 3 and Gaertner and Xu (2012) for Γ = {1, . . . , γ}.
Moreover, the axiom (Comp) is weaker than the property of cancellation independence proposed
by Gaertner and Xu (2012).4
Nevertheless, the property (Comp) may be considered as strong, as it contains both a
requirement for anonymity between voters (voter i is as important as voter j) and a requirement
for measurability of evaluation increments (e.g. the distance from B to A is the same as from
C to B). These two assumptions can be disentangled.
A rule respects Anonymity (A) if for any u, v ∈ ΓI , for any permutation of the voters
σ : I → I, we have u ∼ uσ, where uσ = (uσ(i))i∈I . This is a natural property of fairness among
voters. A rule is Independent of a Single-Increment Rise in the Evaluations (ISIRE) if
for any u, v, u′, v′ ∈ ΓI such that ∃i ∈ I, (u′i = S(ui), v′i = S(vi)) and (∀k 6= i, u′k = uk, v′k = vk),
we have u  v ⇔ u′  v′. In words, the ranking between two candidates is unaffected if a
3Alcantud and Laruelle (2013) show that cancellation (corresponding to axiom (Comp) here) can be weakened
when faithfulness and consistency hold, applying only to profiles such that each candidate receives the same
number of approvals and disapprovals. In my general setting with an arbitrary number of evaluations, such
weakening is also feasible, but probably less interesting, as the weakened axiom would appear less canonical.
4As apparent from the proof, axiom (Comp) only requires the set {u|
∑
i∈I f
EV (ui) = s} to be contained
in a social indifference curve, for each s ∈ {n, . . . , nγ}. Contrastingly, cancellation independence in Gaertner
and Xu (2012) implies that these sets are ranked monotonically according to s. Therefore, there are only three
rules satisfying cancellation independence, whereas the number of rules satisfying (Comp) is the (nγ−n+ 1)-th
ordered Bell number (number of orderings of (nγ − n+ 1) elements, growing more than exponentially).
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voter i increases her evaluation for each candidate by a single increment (e.g. from B to A
for one candidate and from C to B for the other). From a practical perspective, this axiom
is compelling: a rule satisfying (ISIRE) can be viewed as transparent, as any voter can easily
understand that any increment has the same importance, in any situation.
Counter-example: the leximin rule violates (ISIRE). The leximin rule (d’Aspremont
and Gevers, 2002) lex ranks u higher than v if the lowest evaluation in u is higher than the
lowest evaluation in v (and iteratively so in case of equality). Consider the evaluation vectors
u = (A,D), v = (C,C), u′ = (A,C), v′ = (C,B). It is clear that u ≺lex v and u′ lex v′,
although the primed vectors only differ from the non-primed vectors because of the second
voter, who raised her evaluations by a single increment in both vectors. In that case, the two
increments weight differently (the one from D to C is more significant than the one from C to
B).
These axioms lead to a second and more disaggregated characterization of the EV rule.
Theorem 2. Let Γ be a finite set. A rule  satisfies (SP), (A) and (ISIRE) if and only if it
is the Evaluative Voting rule EV . Moreover, the three axioms are mutually independent.
The result pins down the main properties of EV: it is the only efficient and anonymous rule
that is transparent, in the sense that it gives equal weight to all evaluation increments.
4 Continuous scale: Range Voting
In this section, we consider the continuous evaluation set Γ = [0, 1]. For this case, the results
obtained in the previous section can be directly adapted to characterize the Range Voting
rule. However, we show that the continuous structure of the evaluation set allows to derive a
characterization of the Range Voting rule without imposing any measurability requirement.
In fact, the axiom (ISIRE) can be considered as strong, as it contains both a requirement for
measurability of evaluation increments and a requirement for separability. The axiom (ISIRE)
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refers to a situation where a voter i increases all her evaluations by the same amount,5 and
requires the social ranking to be unchanged - it should be the same between u′ and v′ and
between u and v. When ui 6= vi, this implies that increasing the evaluations by the same
amount always has the same impact, whatever the original evaluation level (e.g. raising one’s
evaluation from 0.1 to 0.2 has the same effect as raising it from 0.8 to 0.9). When ui = vi, the
fact that the ranking remains unchanged is a property in its own right, known as separability
or independence of indifferent voters.
Formally, a rule satisfies Separability (Sep) if for any u, v, u′, v′ ∈ ΓI , for any subset of
voters J ⊆ I such that (∀j ∈ J, uj = vj, u′j = v′j) and (∀i ∈ I\J, u′i = ui, v′i = vi), we
have u  v ⇔ u′  v′. In this definition, voters in J are indifferent between u and v, and
also between u′ and v′. The property conveys a notion of subsidiarity of the rule: to compare
two candidates, we need not take into account the evaluations assigned by indifferent voters.
Although natural, the axiom is violated by prominent rules, such as the median rule.
Counter-example: the median rule violates (Sep). For any odd number of voters,
the median rule med ranks u above v if the median of u is above the median of v (Balinski
and Laraki, 2011). With three voters, consider the evaluation vectors u = (0.6, 0.4, 1), v =
(0.8, 0.2, 1), u′ = (0.6, 0.4, 0), v′ = (0.8, 0.2, 0). It is clear that u ≺med v and u′ med v′,
although the primed vectors only differ from the non-primed vectors by the evaluation of the
third voter, who is indifferent between u and v and between u′ and v′.
In the sequel, the axiom (Sep) is used to characterize the class of additively separable rules,
to which the Range Voting rule belongs. We say that a rule is continuous (Cont) if for any
u ∈ [0, 1]I , the sets {v ∈ [0, 1]I |v  u} and {v ∈ [0, 1]I |u  v} are closed with respect to the
Euclidean topology on [0, 1]I . This property expresses the natural view that small changes in
the inputs of the rule - the evaluations - should not lead to dramatic changes in the output of
the rule - the ranking among candidates’ evaluation vectors. Applying Debreu’s theorem, we
5A direct adaptation of (ISIRE) to the evaluation set Γ = [0, 1] would require independence for any trans-
formation of the form u′i = ui + λ, v
′
i = vi + λ, with λ > 0.
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obtain the following characterization of the class of additively separable rules.6
Theorem 3. Let Γ = [0, 1] and #I ≥ 3. A rule  satisfies (SP), (A), (Sep) and (Cont)
if and only if it is additively separable: there exists a continuous and increasing function
f : Γ → R such that ∀u, v ∈ ΓI , u  v ⇔
∑
i∈I f(ui) ≥
∑
i∈I f(vi). Moreover, the four
axioms are mutually independent.
Theorem 3 leaves some space for further exploration. An additively separable rule transforms
the evaluations with some function f before summing them, raising the question of which
additional conditions are required for this function to be the identity.7 I introduce two axioms,
adapted to the evaluation set [0, 1], which are then shown to single out the RV rule.
A rule satisfies Contraction Invariance (CI) if for any u, v ∈ [0, 1]I and scalar α ∈ (0, 1),
we have u ∼ v ⇒ α · u ∼ α · v. According to this axiom,8 if two candidates are equally ranked
by the rule, they should remain equally ranked after a contraction of all their evaluations by
the same scalar α ∈ (0, 1).
A rule respects Symmetry Invariance (SI) if for any u, v ∈ [0, 1]I , we have u ∼ v ⇒
1− u ∼ 1− v, where 1− u = (1− ui)i∈I . This axiom expresses the symmetry of the rule with
respect to the evaluation set [0, 1].9 With this set, the minimal evaluation that a voter can
assign is 0 and the maximal evaluation is 1. Thus, if candidate x receives evaluation a from
a voter, this evaluation can be interpreted either as a vote by a in favor of x or as a vote by
(1 − a) against x. According to this interpretation, the axiom (SI) requires the rule to treat
symmetrically the votes in favor of a candidate and the votes against her.10
6In the additive conjoint measurement literature (Krantz et al., 1971), the proofs of such results are known
to be long and involved. Here, Theorem 3 is derived from a result by Debreu (1960). In an earlier version of
the article (Macé, 2015), a direct proof was provided.
7This approach has been taken by Maskin (1978) to single out the utilitarian social welfare ordering among
the class of generalized utilitarianism, with the axiom of Cardinal Full Comparability. The axioms introduced
here differ from that property, as the rules I consider are not defined on the same domain.
8In the literature on social welfare orderings, a similar property is captured by the axiom of Independence of
the Common Utility Scale (Moulin, 1991).
9This axiom is reminiscent of the property of self-duality in the literature on the bankruptcy problem (Thom-
son, 2003).
10If u is equivalent to v in favor of a candidate, then (SI) implies that u is equivalent to v against a candidate,
this means that 1− v is equivalent to 1− u in favor of a candidate.
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Theorem 4. Let Γ = [0, 1] and #I ≥ 3. A rule  satisfies (SP), (A), (Sep), (Cont),
(CI) and (SI) if and only if it is the Range Voting rule RV . Moreover, the six axioms
are mutually independent.
This axiomatization of the RV rule differs from and complements the one provided in Pivato
(2013a). In that article, RV is characterized up to an equivalence relation between rules, and
this equivalence class corresponds to the class of additively separable rules in my framework.
Thus, Theorem 4 goes beyond Pivato’s axiomatization, as it explicitly takes into account the
evaluation set [0, 1] and describes invariance properties that are characteristic of the RV rule,
encoded in the axioms (CI) and (SI).
5 A general framework: voting rules
I focused in the previous sections on the simple setting of ranking rules, which compare evalua-
tion vectors, that candidates may receive. In this section, I introduce a more natural and more
general notion of aggregation rule and I provide characterization theorems of additive rules in
this context.
5.1 Voting rules
The input of a voting rule is an evaluation profile, a matrix m = (mxi )
x∈X
i∈I , with mi = (m
x
i )
x∈X ∈
ΓX being the ballot cast by voter i and mx = (mxi )i∈I ∈ ΓI being the evaluation vector received
by candidate x. I denote by M = ΓX×I the set of all evaluation profiles. A voting rule is a
correspondence Φ : M ⇒ X such that for any profile m ∈M , Φ(m) 6= ∅. The set Φ(m) is the set
of winning candidates, it is typically a singleton but it may contain several candidates if there
is a tie.11 This notion of a voting rule directly coincides with the procedure used to aggregate
ballots in a voting system with evaluations, and it corresponds to the definition used in the
literature (for instance in Pivato (2013a); Alcantud and Laruelle (2013)). We say that a voting
rule Φ is represented by a ranking rule  if ∀m ∈ M , Φ(m) = {x ∈ X | ∀y ∈ X,mx  my}. It
11Ties are assumed to be broken randomly.
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follows that every ranking rule induces a voting rule, and I denote by ΦEV and ΦRV the voting
rules induced by EV and RV respectively. As we shall see below, some voting rules are not
represented by a ranking rule.
5.2 A representation theorem
I introduce two axioms which are satisfied when a voting rule is represented by a ranking rule.
First, a rule Φ is neutral (N*) if for any permutation σ of X and any profile m ∈ M , we
have x ∈ Φ(m) ⇔ σ(x) ∈ Φ(mσ), where mσ = (mσ(x))x∈X . A neutral rule does not depend
on the names of the candidates. Second, a rule satisfies Binary Independence (BI*) if for
all profiles m,n ∈ M , for all candidates x, y ∈ X such that mx = nx and my = ny, we have
x ∈ Φ(m) ⇒ (y ∈ Φ(n)⇒ x ∈ Φ(n)). In words, if mx is revealed to be (weakly) preferred to
my in profile m, this should remain true in profile n, although the evaluations attributed to
other candidates than x and y may have changed.
Counter-example: the relative utilitarian rule violates (BI*). For Γ = [0, 1], the
relative utilitarian rule12 (Dhillon and Mertens, 1999) is defined by
ΦRU(m) = arg max
x∈X
∑
i∈I
gx(mi), with g
x(mi) =
mxi −miny∈X m
y
i
maxy∈X m
y
i −miny∈X m
y
i
.13
This rule re-scales each evaluation mxi , so that i’s preferred candidate receives the value 1 and
i’s least preferred candidate receives the value 0. As the worth of a candidate depends on the
evaluations received by other candidates, it is easy to see that the rule ΦRU violates (BI*).
The axioms (N*) and (BI*) have been consistently defended in the literature on voting rules,
and as I show below, they jointly characterize the class of ranking rules.
Theorem 5. Let #X ≥ 3. A voting rule Φ satisfies axioms (N*) and (BI*) if and only if it
is represented by a ranking rule .
12The rule ΦRU defined here is introduced as a benchmark, rather than a desirable rule. Whereas it is
legitimate to re-scale individual utilities when there exists no common utility scale, it does not seem appropriate
to re-scale the evaluations here, as voters have a common scale of evaluations Γ.
13by convention 00 = 0.
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This is a structural result, providing conditions under which the choice between candidates
can be resumed to a comparison of their evaluation vectors.14 Theorem 5 naturally relates to
other results obtained in this vein, providing conditions under which a ranking of the candidates
can be reduced to a ranking of their attributes (d’Aspremont and Gevers, 2002; Sprumont,
2016).
In the sequel, Theorem 5 is used to characterize EV and RV in the setting of voting rules.
Axioms from the previous sections are adapted to this new setting and marked with a star.
5.3 Discrete scale: Evaluative Voting
A voting rule Φ is anonymous (A*) if for any profile m ∈M and permutation σ of I, we have
Φ(mσ) = Φ(m), where mσ = (mσ(i))i∈I . A rule Φ satisfies Strong Pareto (SP*) if for any
profile m ∈M and candidate x ∈ X such that for all other candidate z, (∀i ∈ I,mzi ≥Γ mxi ) and
(∃j ∈ I,mzj >Γ mxj ), we have x /∈ Φ(m). In words, if a candidate x is strictly Pareto-dominated
by all other candidates, she should not be elected. When Γ is finite, we say that a rule Φ is
Independent of a Single-Increment Rise in the Evaluations (ISIRE*) if for any profiles
m,n ∈ M and voter i ∈ I such that (∀x ∈ X,nxi = S(mxi )) and (∀j 6= i, nj = mj), we have
Φ(m) = Φ(n). As a corollary of Theorem 2 and Theorem 5, we obtain a characterization of the
EV rule in the general setting.
Theorem 6. Let Γ be a finite set and #X ≥ 3. A voting rule Φ satisfies (N*), (BI*), (A*),
(SP*) and (ISIRE*) if and only if it is the Evaluative Voting rule ΦEV . Moreover, the
five axioms are mutually independent.
14Note in the proof the generality of the result, which remains true if the attributes of the candidates lie in
any abstract set (other than ΓI). Besides, as we show later in the proof of Proposition 1, the result remains
true if we replace (N*) by a weak neutrality axiom, requiring the full set of candidates to be elected when all
candidates receive the same evaluation vector.
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5.4 Continuous scale: Range Voting
A voting rule Φ is continuous (Cont*) if for any candidate x ∈ X, the set {m ∈M |x ∈ Φ(m)}
is closed with respect to the product topology on M = ΓX×I .15 Quite surprisingly, we observe
that the axiom of neutrality can be obtained as a by-product of the axioms (BI*), (SP*) and
(Cont*) when the evaluation set is continuous.
Proposition 1. Let Γ = [0, 1] and #X ≥ 3. If a voting rule Φ satisfies axioms (BI*), (SP*)
and (Cont*), then it satisfies neutrality (N*).
The proof of Proposition 1 starts with the observation that (SP*) and (Cont*) together
imply a weak neutrality property, requiring the full set of candidates to be elected when all
candidates receive the same evaluation vector. The bulk of the proof then consists in showing
that this property, together with (BI*), implies the stronger axiom (N*).
A rule Φ is separable (Sep*) if for all profiles m,n ∈ M and subset of voters J ⊆ I such
that (∀i ∈ J,∀x, y ∈ X,mxi = m
y
i , n
x
i = n
y
i ) and (∀i ∈ I\J,mi = ni), we have Φ(m) = Φ(n).
For Γ = [0, 1], a rule Φ satisfies Contraction Invariance (CI*) if for any profile m ∈ M ,
candidate x ∈ X and scalar α ∈ (0, 1), we have Φ(m) = X ⇒ Φ(α ·m) = X. A rule Φ satisfies
Symmetry Invariance (SI*) if for any profile m ∈ M , Φ(m) = X ⇒ Φ(1 − m) = X,
where 1−m = (1−mxi )x∈Xi∈I . In this general setting, the axioms (CI*) and (SI*) impose weak
invariance requirements: if all the candidates are chosen in one profile, then they should also be
all chosen in the modified profile. As a corollary of Theorem 4, Theorem 5 and Proposition 1,
we obtain a characterization of the RV rule in the general setting.
Theorem 7. Let Γ = [0, 1], #X ≥ 3 and #I ≥ 3. A voting rule Φ satisfies (BI*), (A*),
(SP*), (Cont*), (Sep*), (CI*) and (SI*) if and only if it is the Range Voting rule
ΦRV . Moreover, the seven axioms are mutually independent.
Note that, by virtue of Proposition 1, axiom (N*) need not be invoked, and the characteri-
zation is obtained with independent axioms.
15In the literature, this notion is sometimes referred to as the hemicontinuity of the correspondence Φ (see
Ok (2007)).
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6 Concluding remarks
6.1 Discrete scale versus continuous scale
Section 4 shows how the class of additively separable rules can be characterized with the ax-
iom (Sep) when the evaluation set is [0, 1]. The following counter-example demonstrates that
this characterization does not extend for a discrete scale,16 and suggests that Theorem 4 and
Theorem 7 cannot be adapted to axiomatize the EV rule.
Proposition 2. For #I = 3 and γ = 4, there exists a non-additively separable rule satisfying
(SP), (A) and (Sep).
This result also reveals a distinction between the axiom of Separability, defined for a fixed
electorate, and the axiom of Reinforcement,17 defined for a variable electorate. The latter axiom
has often been used to characterize the class of scoring rules, to which EV and RV belong, under
various assumptions on the nature of the ballots (Smith, 1973; Young, 1975; Myerson, 1995;
Balinski and Laraki, 2011; Pivato, 2013b). Although both axioms convey a similar notion of
consistency of collective decisions, the axiom of Reinforcement is formally stronger than the
axiom of Separability. On the one hand, it is easy to see that a variable-population rule satisfying
Reinforcement is separable for any fixed electorate. On the other hand, there are separable rules
defined for a fixed electorate that cannot be extended to a (anonymous) variable-electorate rule
satisfying Reinforcement, such as the rule considered in the proof of Proposition 2.
6.2 Strategic properties of EV and RV rules
The analysis presented in this article is rooted in the assumption that voters truthfully evaluate
the candidates, which could be called into question. If the election is conceived as a process of
preference aggregation, Núñez and Laslier (2014) have shown that the outcome of an election
16The literature (Krantz et al., 1971) identifies a countable family of axioms, extending (Sep), that are
necessary to have an additively separable rule, for arbitrary #I and γ. The counter-example is thus general.
In a previous version of the paper (Macé, 2015), I pointed out that (SP), (A) and (Sep) characterize additive
separability in the specific case where γ ≤ 3.
17This axiom states that if two sub-electorates agree on a ranking between two candidates, then the rule
applied to the joint electorate should produce the same ranking.
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under the EV rule is the same as under Approval Voting, provided that the electorate is large
and strategic. In this perspective, it is just as if intermediate evaluations do not matter. Never-
theless, if voters’ expressive motives are stronger than their strategic motives, one might expect
voters to make use of the full spectrum of evaluations in their ballots,18 and this could lead
to collective judgments more aligned with the utilitarian principle than those obtained under
Approval Voting. Finally, if the election is conceived as a process of information aggregation,
the flexibility of the EV (or RV) rule allows for a nuanced and rich information revelation by
voters, which could improve the quality of information aggregation compared to other voting
rules. This last consideration could be explored in more detail in further research.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
It is straightforward that EV satisfies all the mentioned axioms. Let  be a rule satisfying
axioms (SP) and (Comp). Let u, v ∈ ΓI be two evaluation vectors such that
∑
i∈I f
EV (ui) =∑
i∈I f
EV (vi). The vector v can be obtained from u by a finite sequence of transformations
of the form {(ui, uj) 7→ (S(ui), P (uj))}, where P (a) denotes the predecessor of evaluation a
(b = P (a) if and only if a = S(b)). It follows, by iterated application of axiom (Comp) and
transitivity of ∼, that u ∼ v.
As a result, there exists a function F : {n, . . . , nγ} → R such that:
u  v ⇔ F
(∑
i∈I
fEV (ui)
)
≥ F
(∑
i∈I
fEV (vi)
)
.
By axiom (SP), the function F is increasing. Finally, the rule  is the EV rule. 
18This is indeed what has been observed in experiments conducted on the EV rule, and in particular for in
situ experiments, in which voters have actual political preferences (Igersheim et al., 2016).
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
It is straightforward that EV satisfies all the mentioned axioms. In the sequel, I show that (A)
and (ISIRE) imply together (Comp), and the result becomes a corollary of Theorem 1. Let 
be a rule satisfying axioms (A) and (ISIRE). Let u and v be two evaluation vectors such that
vi = S(ui), uj = S(vj) and ∀k 6= i, j, vk = uk. I note u−i,j = (uk)k 6=i,j and obtain successively:
(
ui, vj, u−i,j
)
∼
(
vj, ui, u−i,j
)
(A)(
ui, S(vj), u−i,j
)
∼
(
vj, S(ui), u−i,j
)
(ISIRE)(
ui, uj, u−i,j
)
∼
(
vj, vi, u−i,j
)
(
ui, uj, u−i,j
)
∼
(
vi, vj, u−i,j
)
(A)
u ∼ v
Therefore, the rule  satisfies (Comp). 
Independence of the axioms. Axiom (A) is violated by the rule: u  v ⇔
∑
i∈I λif
EV (ui) ≥∑
i∈I λif
EV (vi) if the weights (λi)i∈I are not all equal. Axiom (SP) is not satisfied by the con-
stant rule (for which all vectors are equivalent). Finally, axiom (ISIRE) is violated by the
leximin rule (d’Aspremont and Gevers, 2002).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
It is clear that RV satisfies all the mentioned axioms. Let be a rule satisfying axioms (SP), (A),
(Sep) and (Cont). I apply the result of Debreu (1960) on additive separability. As Debreu puts
it, the relation  is a complete and continuous preordering on [0, 1]I , the product of n connected
and separable spaces. By axiom (Sep), the n factors of [0, 1]I are independent. By axiom (SP),
each factor is essential. By application of Debreu’s theorem, there exist continuous functions
f i : [0, 1] → R such that u  v ⇔
∑
i∈I f
i(ui) ≥
∑
i∈I f
i(vi). By axiom (A), all the functions
should be the same, ∀i ∈ I, f i = f . By axiom (SP), the function f is increasing. Therefore,
the rule is additively separable. The independence of the axioms is a direct consequence of the
16
independence of the axioms in Theorem 4, demonstrated below. 
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
It is clear that RV satisfies all the mentioned axioms. Let  be a rule satisfying axioms (SP),
(A), (Sep), (Cont), (CI) and (SI). We know from Theorem 3 that there exists a continuous and
increasing function f : [0, 1] → R such that u  v if and only if
∑
i∈I f(ui) ≥
∑
i∈I f(vi). Let
us assume without loss of generality that f([0, 1]) = [0, 1]. I show that ∀x ∈ [0, 1], f(x) = x.
Step 1. f(x) + f(1− x) = 1 for all x ∈ [0,1].
Let x ∈ [0, 1] and define z ∈ [0, 1] as the unique number such that f(z) = f(x)+f(1−x)
2
. We
obtain (z, z) ∼ (x, 1 − x). It follows from axioms (SI) and (A) that we have (1 − z, 1 − z) ∼
(1− x, x) ∼ (x, 1− x) ∼ (z, z). An application of axiom (SP) gives z = 1− z and thus z = 1
2
.
Finally we obtain that for all x ∈ [0, 1], f
(
1
2
)
= f(x)+f(1−x)
2
. Taking x = 0 and knowing that
f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1, we find that f
(
1
2
)
= 1
2
. Thus: ∀x ∈ [0, 1], f(x) + f(1− x) = 1.
Step 2. f(x) = x for any dyadic number x ∈ [0, 1].
For any integer p ≥ 1, let us define Dp = {
k
2p
| 0 ≤ k ≤ 2p}. A number x ∈ [0, 1] is said to be
dyadic if it belongs to some Dp, p ≥ 1. I show by induction on p that f(x) = x for all x ∈ Dp.
We know that f(x) = x for all x ∈ D1. Let p ≥ 2 and assume that f is the identity function
on the set Dp−1. Let d ∈ Dp : d can be written as d = k2p with k ∈ {0, . . . , 2
p}. If k is even,
we know that d ∈ Dp−1 and thus f(d) = d. Let us first consider the case where k is odd and
k < 2p−1, so that d < 1
2
.
We have
{
k−1
2p−1
, k
2p−1
, k+1
2p−1
}
⊆ Dp−1. It follows that f
(
k−1
2p−1
)
= k−1
2p−1
, f
(
k
2p−1
)
= k
2p−1
,
f
(
k+1
2p−1
)
= k+1
2p−1
. Thus,
(
k
2p−1
, k
2p−1
)
∼
(
k−1
2p−1
, k+1
2p−1
)
.
Applying the axiom (CI) with scalar α = 1
2
, we get
(
k
2p
, k
2p
)
∼
(
k−1
2p
, k+1
2p
)
. Moreover,
since k is odd, k − 1 and k + 1 are even, meaning that
{
k−1
2p
, k+1
2p
}
⊆ Dp−1. So, we know that
f
(
k−1
2p
)
= k−1
2p
, f
(
k+1
2p
)
= k+1
2p
. As a conclusion, we obtain 2× f
(
k
2p
)
= k−1
2p
+ k+1
2p
= 2× k
2p
.
Finally f(d) = d. If d > 1
2
, we obtain f(d) = d by application of Step 1.
Conclusion : f(x) = x for all x ∈ [0,1]. This follows immediately from the continuity of f .
Thus, the rule  is the RV rule. 
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Independence of the axioms. I exhibit six different rules, each satisfying exactly five of the
six axioms:
• a weighted utilitarianism WU,λ (d’Aspremont and Gevers, 2002), defined by u WU,λ v
if
∑
i∈I λiui ≥
∑
i∈I λivi for some vector (λi)i∈I of positive weights. If the weights are not
all equal, WU,λ violates (A). By linearity, all the other axioms are satisfied.
• the constant rule CT , defined by u CT v for all u, v ∈ [0, 1]I , violates (SP).
• the leximin rule LEX , (d’Aspremont and Gevers, 2002) violates (Cont). It satisfies the
other axioms, in particular axiom (SI) as u ∼LEX v if and only if u is a permutation of v.
• a weighted rank-utilitarianism WRU,λ (d’Aspremont and Gevers, 2002), defined by u WRU,λ
v if
∑
i∈I λiũi ≥
∑
i∈I λiṽi where (λi)i∈I is a vector of positive weights and ũ (resp. ṽ) de-
notes the sorted permutation of u (resp v). If the weights are such that ∀i ∈ I, λi = λn−i
and are not all equal, the rule WRU,λ violates (Sep). It satisfies the other axioms, in
particular axiom (SI) as
∑
i∈I λi
˜(1− u)i =
∑
i∈I λi(1− ũn−i) = (
∑
i∈I λi)−
∑
i∈I λiũi.
• a symmetric rule SYM , defined by u SYM v if
∑
i∈I f(ui) ≥
∑
i∈I f(vi) with f(x) = 2x
2
if x ≤ 1
2
and f(x) = 1− 2(1−x)2 if x > 1
2
. It violates (CI) as 2f(1/2) = f(0) + f(1), but
2f(1/4) < f(0) + f(1/2). The rule satisfies the other axioms, in particular axiom (SI) as
f(1− x) = 1− f(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1].
• the square rule SQ, defined by u SQ v if
∑
i∈I u
2
i ≥
∑
i∈I v
2
i , violates (SI).
A.5 Proof of Theorem 5
It is immediate that if a voting rule is represented by a ranking rule, it satisfies both (N*) and
(BI*). Now, let Φ be a voting rule satisfying (N*) and (BI*).
We define the binary relation Φ on ΓI by u Φ v if there exist a profile m ∈ M and two
candidates x, y ∈ X such that mx = u, my = v and x ∈ Φ(m). Let us show that Φ is a
ranking rule.
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First, the relation Φ is complete. Take u, v ∈ ΓI , and let x ∈ X. Consider the profile m
defined by mx = u and ∀y 6= x, my = v. By definition of a voting rule, there must be at least
one element in Φ(m). Thus, by definition of the relation Φ, we get either u Φ v or v Φ u.
Second, the relation Φ is transitive. Assume u Φ v and v Φ w. There exists a profile
m ∈M , two candidates x, y ∈ X such that mx = u, my = v and x ∈ Φ(m). There also exists a
profile n ∈M , two candidates z, t ∈ X such that mz = v, mt = w and z ∈ Φ(n). By neutrality
(N*) applied to the profile n, we can assume that z = y and t 6= x, y. We construct a third
profile l, defined by lx = u, ly = v, lt = w and for all r 6= x, y, t, lr = w. We have three cases:
• if x ∈ Φ(l), then we obtain that u Φ w.
• if y ∈ Φ(l), then we apply binary independence (BI*): we have x ∈ Φ(m) and y ∈ Φ(l),
with mx = lx (= u) and my = ly (= v), therefore x ∈ Φ(l) and we are back to the first
case.
• if r ∈ Φ(l) with r 6= x, y, we can assume by neutrality (N*) that r = t (remember that
lr = lt = w). We apply binary independence (BI*): we have y ∈ Φ(n) and t ∈ Φ(l), with
ny = ly (= v) and nt = lt (= w), therefore y ∈ Φ(l) and we are back to the second case.
Finally, we obtain that u Φ w: the relation Φ is transitive.
The final step is to show that the voting rule Φ is represented by the ranking rule Φ. First,
if x ∈ Φ(m), we have by definition of Φ: ∀y ∈ X, mx Φ my. Second, let m ∈ M , x ∈ X be
such that ∀y ∈ X, mx Φ my. Let y ∈ Φ(m). We have by assumption mx Φ my. This relation
is obtained for some profile n ∈ M and candidates z, t ∈ X, such that nz = mx, nt = my and
z ∈ Φ(n). By neutrality (N*), we may assume that z = x and t = y. By application of binary
independence (BI*), as we have x ∈ Φ(n) and y ∈ Φ(m), we get x ∈ Φ(m). Finally, Φ is
represented by the ranking rule Φ.
Independence of the axioms. A rule electing always the same candidate satisfies (BI*)
but not (N*). Conversely, the rule ΦRU satisfies (N*) but not (BI*).
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A.6 Theorem 6: independence of the axioms
Take a linear order >X on X. The rule Φ
1 defined by
Φ1(m) = max
{
x ∈ X
∣∣∣∀y ∈ X, ∑
i∈I
fEV (mxi ) ≥
∑
i∈I
fEV (myi )
}
satisfies axioms (BI*), (A*), (SP*) and (ISIRE*) but not (N*). Conversely, consider the
discrete analog of the relative utilitarian rule, defined by Φ2(m) = arg maxx∈X
∑
i∈I g
x(fEV (mi)).
The rule Φ2 satisfies axioms (N*), (A*), (SP*) and (ISIRE*) but not (BI*).
A.7 Proof of Proposition 1
Let Φ be a rule satisfying (BI*), (SP*) and (Cont*). First, we note that Φ satisfies a weak
form of neutrality: if all candidates receive the same evaluation vector, they must all be elected.
Consider a profile m such that ∀x ∈ X,mx = u ∈ [0, 1]I . Take x ∈ X, and consider the profile
n(ε) defined for ε > 0 by n(ε)x = u and ∀y 6= x, n(ε)y = (1− ε) · u. By axiom (SP*), we have
that Φ(n(ε)) = {x}. By axiom (Cont*), when ε tends to 0, we obtain that x ∈ Φ(m). We
conclude that Φ(m) = X.
Second, we show that if two candidates have the same evaluation vector, they must have
the same fate: if mx = my, then x ∈ Φ(m) ⇒ y ∈ Φ(m). Assume mx = my = u ∈ [0, 1]I and
suppose x ∈ Φ(m). Consider the profile n defined by ∀z ∈ X,nz = u, for which we just showed
that Φ(n) = X. We have mx = nx, my = ny, x ∈ Φ(m) and y ∈ Φ(n). By application of
(BI*), we obtain y ∈ Φ(m).
Third, we show that if a profile n is obtained from a profile m by replacing the evaluation
vector of a candidate y by the evaluation vector of a winner x (in profile m), then y must be
a winner in profile n: if x ∈ Φ(m), ny = mx and ∀z 6= y, nz = mz, then y ∈ Φ(n). To prove
this claim, let t ∈ Φ(n). If t = x, we have x ∈ Φ(n), and therefore y ∈ Φ(n) by the second
observation. If t 6= x, y, by application of (BI*), we get that x ∈ Φ(n), and thus also y ∈ Φ(n).
Fourth, we show that if a profile n is obtained from a profile m by replacing the evaluation
vector of a candidate y by the evaluation vector of another candidate z, winners in m (other
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than y) must remain winners in n: if x ∈ Φ(m), ny = mz and ∀t 6= y, nt = mt, then x ∈ Φ(n).
To prove this claim, let t ∈ Φ(n). If t 6= y, by application of (BI*), we obtain that x ∈ Φ(n). If
t = y, we know from our second observation that, as nz = ny, z ∈ Φ(n), and therefore x ∈ Φ(n).
Fifth, let us show that z ∈ Φ(m) ⇔ σ(z) ∈ Φ(mσ) when σ is a transposition. Let σ be a
transposition switching x and y, let m ∈M and let z ∈ Φ(m). To show that σ(z) ∈ Φ(mσ), we
consider two cases:
• z /∈ {x, y}. In that case, σ(z) = z. Let t ∈ Φ(mσ), and consider two sub-cases:
– t /∈ {x, y}. By application of axiom (BI*) to profiles m and mσ, we obtain z ∈
Φ(mσ).
– t ∈ {x, y}, for instance (w.l.o.g.) t = x. Consider the profile n defined by nx =
my, ny = my and ∀r 6= x, y, nr = mr. As z ∈ Φ(m), we obtain from our fourth
observation that z ∈ Φ(n). By application of (BI*) to profiles n and mσ, we get
z ∈ Φ(mσ).
• z ∈ {x, y}, for instance (w.l.o.g.) z = x, so that σ(z) = y. Let t ∈ Φ(mσ), and consider
two sub-cases:
– t /∈ {x, y}. Consider the profile n defined by nx = mx, ny = mx and ∀r 6= x, y, nr =
mr. By our third observation, as z = x ∈ Φ(m), we get y ∈ Φ(n). Then, applying
(BI*) to profiles n and mσ, we get y ∈ Φ(mσ).
– t ∈ {x, y}. If t = y, the result is obtained directly. We are left to treat the remaining
case: z = t = x. As #X ≥ 3, let r /∈ {x, y}. We construct three profiles m1,m2,m3,
with (m1)x = mx, (m2)x = (m3)x = my; (m1)y = (m2)y = my, (m3)y = mx;
(m1)r = (m2)r = (m3)r = mx and ∀s 6= x, y, r, (m1)s = (m2)s = (m3)s = ms. By our
third observation, we get r ∈ Φ(m1). By application of our fourth observation to m1
and m2, we get r ∈ Φ(m2). By application of our third observation to m2 and m3,
we get y ∈ Φ(m3). By application of (BI*) to m3 and mσ, we get y ∈ Φ(mσ).
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Finally, we conclude that, as any permutation is a product of transpositions, the rule Φ satisfies
neutrality (N*).
A.8 Theorem 7: independence of the axioms
Let us define the rule Φ3 by
Φ3(m) = arg max
x∈X
∑
i∈I
hx(mi),
where hx(mi) =
1
2
mxi +
1
5
(
min
y 6=x
myi + max
y 6=x
myi
)
. With this rule the value of an evaluation is a
weighted sum of this evaluation and the lowest and highest evaluations given by the same voter
to the other candidates. The weights are chosen so that Φ3 satisfies (SP*): indeed mxi = m
y
i ⇔
hx(mi) = h
y(mi) and m
x
i > m
y
i ⇔ hx(mi) > hy(mi). We observe that Φ3 also satisfies (A*),
(Cont*), (Sep*) and (CI*). The rule Φ3 also satisfies (SI*) since hx(1−mi) =
9
10
− hx(mi).
Moreover, Φ3 fails to satisfy (BI*). Consider the profile m such that m1 = (0, 1, 0, 1) and
m2 = (1, 0, 0, 0) and profile n such that n1 = (0, 1, 0, 0) and n2 = (1, 0, 0, 0) (candidates are
ranged in the following order: x, y, z, t, voters are 1, 2). We have nx = mx and ny = my.
Moreover, Φ3(m) = {y, t} and Φ3(n) = {x, y}, therefore Φ3 violates (BI*).
A.9 Proof of Proposition 2
The following example is adapted from Sertel and Slinko (2007). Take Γ = {A,B,C,D}, with
the order A Γ B Γ C Γ D, and assume #I = 3. Consider the following anonymous rule:
A3  A2B  A2C  A2D  AB2  ABC  ABD  AC2  ACD  B3  B2C  AD2 
B2D  BC2  BCD  BD2  C3  C2D  CD2  D3, where B2C  AD2 means that
(B,B,C)  (A,D,D). The rule satisfies (SP) and (Sep), as can be verified. However, we have:
(a) ACD  B3; (b) B2C  AD2; and (c) BD2  C2D.
Assume that the rule is additively separable, with value f . We have then: (a) f(A)+f(C)+
f(D) > 3f(B); (b) 2f(B) + f(C) > f(A) + 2f(D); and (c) f(B) + 2f(D) > 2f(C) + f(D).
We obtain by summation: f(A) + 3f(B) + 2f(C) + 3f(D) > f(A) + 3f(B) + 2f(C) + 3f(D),
hence a contradiction. 
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Remark (for Section 6.1): the rule  introduced above cannot be extended into a (anony-
mous) variable-population rule satisfying Reinforcement. If this was the case, we would have
ACDB2C  B3AD2 (from (a) and (b)). And then ACDB2CBD2  B3AD2C2D (combining
with (c)). This would violate the anonymity of the variable-population rule.
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